Stated Justice Van Devanter in Utah Power & Light Co. v. U.S., 243 U.S. 389 (1917):

"The first position taken by the defendants is that their claims must be tested by the laws of the state in which the lands are situate rather than by the legislation of Congress, and in support of this position they say that lands of the United States within a state, when not used or needed for a fort or other governmental purpose of the United States, are subject to the jurisdiction, powers, and laws of the state in the same way and to the same extent as are similar lands of others. To this we cannot assent. Not only does the Constitution (art. 4, 3, cl. 2) commit to Congress the power 'to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting' the lands of the United States, but the settled course of legislation, congressional and state, and repeated decisions of this court, have gone upon the theory that the power of Congress is exclusive, and that only through its exercise in some form can rights in lands belonging to the United States be acquired. True, for many purposes a state has civil and criminal jurisdiction over lands within its limits belonging to the United States, but this jurisdiction does not extend to any matter that is not consistent with full power in the United States to protect its lands, to control their use, and to prescribe in what manner others may require rights in them....From the earliest times Congress by its legislation, applicable alike in the states and territories, has regulated in many particulars the use by others of the lands of the United States, has prohibited and made punishable various acts calculated to be injurious to them or to prevent their use in the way intended, and has provided for and controlled the acquisition of rights of way over them for highways, railroads, canals, ditches, telegraph lines, and the like. The states and the public have almost uniformly accepted this legislation as controlling, and in the instances where it has been questioned in this court its validity has been upheld and its supremacy over state enactments sustained....And so we are of opinion that the inclusion within a state of lands of the United States does not take from Congress the power to control their occupancy and use, to protect them from trespass and injury, and to prescribe the conditions upon which others may obtain rights in them, even though this may involve the exercise in some measure of what commonly is known as the police power. 'A different rule,' as was said in Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518, 42 L. ed. 260, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 864, 'would place the public domain of the United States completely at the mercy of state legislation.'

"It results that state laws, including those relating to the exercise of the power of eminent domain, have no bearing upon a controversy such as is here presented, save as they may have been adopted or made applicable by Congress...."

Stated Justice Marshall in Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976):

"...appellees have presented no support for their position that the Clause grants Congress only the power to dispose of, to make incidental rules regarding the use of, and to protect federal property. This failure is hardly surprising, for the Clause, in broad terms, gives Congress the power to determine what are "needful" rules "respecting" the public lands. United States v. San Francisco, 310 U.S., at 29-30; Light v. United States, 220 U.S., at 537; United States v. Gratiot, 14 Pet., at 537-538. And while the furthest reaches of the power granted by the Property Clause have not yet been definitively resolved, we have repeatedly observed that '[t]he power over the public land thus entrusted to Congress is without limitations.'United States v. San Francisco, supra, at 29..."

"The decided cases have supported this expansive reading. It is the Property Clause, for instance, that provides the basis for governing the Territories of the United States... And even over public land within the States, '[t]he general Government doubtless has a power over its own property analogous to the police power of the several States, and the extent to which it may go in the exercise of such power is measured by the exigencies of the particular case.' Camfield v. United States, supra, at 525. We have noted, for example, that the Property Clause gives Congress the power over the public lands 'to control their occupancy and use, to protect them from trespass and injury and to prescribe the conditions upon which others may obtain rights in them . . . .' Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243 U.S. 389, 405 (1917). And we have approved legislation respecting the public lands '[i]f it be found to be necessary for the protection of the public, or of intending settlers [on the public lands].' Camfield v. United States, supra, at 525. In short, Congress exercises the powers both of a proprietor and of a legislature over the public domain. Alabama v. Texas, supra, at 273; Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263, 297 (1929); United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 474 (1915). Although the Property Clause does not authorize 'an exercise of a general control over public policy in a State,' it does permit 'an exercise of the complete power which Congress has over particular public property entrusted to it.' United States v. San Francisco, supra, at 30 (footnote omitted). In our view, the 'complete power' that U.S. 529, 541] Congress has over public lands necessarily includes the power to regulate and protect the wildlife living there."